Manchester United: Sometimes I hate them, sometimes I love them.
That quote from the Manchester United manager captures what the club has embodied for much of the past decade. I’m neither a psychologist nor a body language expert, so I won’t dwell on that side of the discussion — while it has some value in the right context, I feel it’s often overanalyzed by those without real expertise.
If you have watched United vs Grimsby then United vs Burnley, the immediate thought would be, are these two teams the same?
On Saturday, Manchester United had ample amount of chances vs Burnley to be 2–0 up and secure the match early. Yet just 3 days earlier, they couldn’t string a couple of passes together vs a league 2 opposition.
So What changed?
Basically the plan from the opposition and the XI.
Against Grimsby, United faced a man to man press all over the pitch. This prevented United’s buildup and stifled them from achieving wide overloads; a fundamental principle in Amorim’s 3-4-2-1. (1)
Ok. Burnley did the same, why were Grimsby more successful?
Simple. United rarely attempted to build vs Burnley. Burnley M2M press initially constrained United’s short build-up so United started going long. Also, United started to slow their buildup down, so they can attempt the second principle of Amorim’s tactics.
The second (2) principle that Amorim relies on in his approach is winning second balls through pressure, intensity and winning duels. His final principle (3) is switching play to one of the 10s, tasked with stretching the defensive line.
Amorim on Mbeumo: “It was impressive, the way he stretched the team, the quality he has in the first touch. You can feel that we are a different team, because when we win the ball, we have one guy stretching the team. Last season we struggled a little bit with that.”
Mason Mount is vital both for switching play and for injecting intensity into the press after securing second balls. In the Grimsby match, United lined up with the following XI:
The lineup above screams lack of intensity. If either Cunha or Amad has a bad game then Amorim’s plan collapses, as they don’t have the attributes for it. That’s exactly what unfolded — Amad delivered arguably one of the poorest performances I’ve seen from him.
There were 5 players that were crucial to the difference between the two games. Bryan Mbeumo, Mason Mount, Bruno Fernandes, Matheus Cunha, and Amad Diallo.
When United played Grimsby, those players were missing or 3 of them at least, automatically, the positives in United’s plan fell apart and what was left were their structural weaknesses.
Benjamin Šeško hasn’t played enough for me to form a full rational analysis, but it’s clear why Viktor Gyökeres proved a perfect fit for Ruben Amorim’s blueprint at Sporting. Viktor Gyökeres might not be a very technical player or an amazing hold up player but he has the intensity and transition power which fits right into Ruben Amorim’s 3 core principles in-possession. Šeško, I can’t say the same so far.
In the second half vs Grimsby, United brought on Mbeumo, Fernandes, and De ligt for Ugarte, Dorgu, and Fredricson. Immediately, the complexion of the game changed, then later Mount for Heaven. All 5 crucial players for Amorim’s in possession principles were on the field. Only at that point did United began to create genuine chances.
Now vs Burnley, United started with those 5 on the pitch. The intensity was there from the get go. No doubt about that.
United’s creativity vs Burnley.
There’s no question United generated plenty of chances against Burnley, but as an analyst — a curse at times — you’re always asking how those chances were actually created. Is the method sustainable and scalable?
Other than a shot from distance around the 4th minute, United had to wait until the 13th minute for two decent chances to come right after each other for Mbeumo.
In the first 25 minutes, these were United’s open-play chances. The aim here isn’t to downplay them, but to analyze the methods of creation. Every one of these opportunities came from opposition goal kicks, where United won the second ball and quickly switched play to Mbeumo’s flank. Beyond that, they produced only one or two decent chances from set pieces.
This routine kept repeating in the entire match for United until Mason Mount was subbed off.
As noted earlier, one of United’s core on-ball principles is bypassing midfield by building through the flanks. When that option is cut off, they instead play long into the 10s — either to chase beyond the last line or to hold up play and lay it back into midfield, before releasing a ball over the top once one of the 10s has dragged a CB out of position.
The following is a pass to the 10 (Mbeumo) then a pass back to WB then Mbeumo expected a ball over the top. Look at how he ran after he dragged the CB out of possession.
However, Zirkzee, being a natural combination player, broke from the routine — dropping in to link via 1–2 with Amad , who then released Mbeumo. By then, Mbeumo’s initial run had already been wasted, and both the defender and keeper had read the play. It was too late. This, in turn, highlights two points: first, why Zirkzee sees limited minutes, and second, why Mainoo struggles to secure a spot in the starting XI.
Zirkzee and Mainoo are excellent players, but like anyone else, they come with weaknesses — and whether they’re favoured or not depends on the manager’s principles. In Amorim’s system, they fall short in two key areas: first, the intensity and aggression required in pressing and contesting first and second balls; second, his preference for wide overloads in buildup over midfield progression. This automatically renders both players in-possession abilities unimportant to Amorim, both in and out of possession.
Ironically, Joshua Zirkzee and Kobbie Mainoo, as outstanding ball carriers and dribblers, can break United’s buildup problems against a man-to-man press through their dribbling — pulling defenders out of position and disrupting defensive shapes. Then again, knowing what we know about Amorim’s second principle that ability ultimately counts for little.
But Amorim bought Bryan Mbeumo and Matheus Cunha for their carrying ability and dribbling ?
While their dribbling doesn’t reach the technical level of Joshua Zirkzee and Kobbie Mainoo, Bryan Mbeumo and Matheus Cunha, on top of those two things, bring the intensity and aggression that Amorim demands.
So what happened in the second half vs Burnley?
Well, you have probably guessed it by now. The personnel in United’s starting line changed. Cunha was injured and replaced by Zirkzee and Mainoo replaced Mount.
To be fair, they weren’t the sole reason United suddenly looked shaky out of possession. A second factor was Burnley’s adjustment: shifting from a 4–4–2 to a 5–3–2 out of possession, giving them cover against United’s wide overloads, negating United’s constant control of second balls, and a +1 in midfield — occupied by Hannibal Mejbri.
With a back-5 shape combined with M2M press, United’s primary method of advancing into dangerous areas was blunted. Now aware of United’s reliance on wide overloads, Burnley mirrored Grimsby’s pressing approach — deliberately conceding central zones, knowing United rarely use them.
United’s 5–2–3 out of possession weakness have been butchered enough online and I’ve talked about it in the previous Fulham match analysis. Now that Mejbri was the extra man who was overloading Casemiro and Mainoo. Burnley found a lot more ease in by-passing United’s initial line of pressure into their midfield.
Beyond the two-man midfield being outnumbered, that shape presents another two problems:
Problem 1: Centre-backs stepping out.
Amorim’s out-of-possession principles demand that the centre-backs track attackers and any roaming midfielder dropping deep — particularly the wide centre-backs, Yoro and Shaw. This can cause a lot of confusion if that CB is bypassed or if that CB doesn’t return to shape when United are facing a cross.
In the example above, the backline is shifting as the opposition delivers a cross, and in the process, every defender loses their marker. This wasn’t an isolated incident — it has occurred in previous games as well.
When the wide centre-backs step up vertically to pressure, there’s no issue — the shape holds as long as compactness is maintained. Problems arise, however, when they’re forced to shift across horizontal channels. It’s clear the centre-backs are uneasy stepping up to close players into midfield, as it leaves large gaps in the defensive line.
The only real solution is a full man-to-man scheme to support the narrow and aggressive three-man forward press. The problem for United is that their central midfielders lack the physicality to sustain it. When they dropped into a 5–4–1 last season, it gave them greater stability out-of-possession, although, it turns them into more of a counter attacking team and forces them to cede further territory and control.
Problem 2: Physical Demands
“Physical performance is evaluating football performance.” ~ Marcelo Bielsa
The contrast between United’s first-half and second-half physical expenditure highlights the unsustainability of their approach. Amorim’s United thrive early through high-intensity combinations and channel balls, transitions, and constant up-back-throughs but the approach is physically taxing. Intensity is valuable, but relying on it as the entire game plan is not physically sustainable, causing performance levels to fluctuate.
The concern is when the physical output exerted doesn’t only cause a reduced level of performance but injuries like with Matheus Cunha. This reminds me when United’s game plan under Erik ten Hag was a 100 miles per hour basket ball game.
The ideal approach is a team that controls territory, pins the opposition back, and then creates — an approach that sustains physical performance across the full 90 minutes. United’s front three are burdened with heavy demands in and out of possession. The ground they must cover and the large spaces they’re asked to attack inevitably force them to slow down as the game wears on. It is impractical over the course of 90mins.
Once United are forced to slow down, Amorim’s system offers no principles for central progression or creation in settled possession, since control is not a high priority.
Manchester United are very lucky they will not play in Europe this season else the front three will gas out by the middle of the season.
So, what now?
Like his predecessor ETH, Ruben Amorim’s plan is very ambitious and in an ideal world where he gets players with the stamina and physical attributes he desires, United will continue to have underlying concerns.
Again, I will make no conclusion of my own. There’s plenty of football to be played but I cannot see this game model succeeding in the future and even if we do well with it this season under less pressure, it will have to be altered at some point if United want to compete on all fronts every season.
