A win is a win. United needed some luck.
Football is a game of fine margins — one moment can trigger a ripple effect that completely shifts the outcome. Its beauty lies in the fact that it takes is a single decisive external factor falling in either side’s favor.
Yesterday’s match between Manchester United and Chelsea felt strange, but for me, it was practically decided in the 21st minute when Enzo Maresca substituted Cole Palmer— which signaled that all Chelsea’s attacking threat were off.
In my earlier breakdown of the Burnley and Fulham games, I pointed out two key aspects of United: their high intensity and their fixture load. This season, a consistent theme has been the way United start matches with intensity and directness. Their lighter schedule has also been a factor, giving them the recovery time needed to play with that aggression while keeping injury risks lower.
They have done this in all their matches except against Grimsby. Grimsby were just better the entire first half. The issue for United they never take advantage of that initial intensity. So Chelsea decided to help them by not weathering United’s initial intensity.
It’s hard to gauge how the game might have unfolded — or whether Chelsea would have adapted — because Robert Sánchez’s error completely altered the course of the match.
The charts above only reflect the intensity levels the team put in. The worrying part is that, despite all this effort, United never manage to capitalize on it.
Why though?
The problem lies in their intent. United never approach games with the aim of controlling them, which is clear from their consistent neglect of the midfield in possession. Against Chelsea, their dominance came purely from numerical superiority (11v10), not from tactical design.
This leads us to the crux of the issue. Watching the match back several times (4x), it’s clear that United have very few creative avenues beyond their wide overloads — switching play to the wing-back and delivering crosses. The approach itself isn’t flawed, but the problem is that the final ball often falls to Patrick Dorgu. Dorgu consistently ends United games with more touches in the opposition box than any of their forwards. Across five matches, he’s attempted 24 crosses from deep or inside the box, with only five reaching a target — and that doesn’t even factor in the extra effort needed from the recipient to make something of them. It’s reminiscent of when Diogo Dalot ended up on the end of United’s biggest chances, only to waste them. ten Hag’s setup had the wingers (Rashford, Antony/Garnacho) hugging the touchline, while the full-backs — who weren’t particularly effective or great in the final third — were running the inside channels into the box.
The other way United creates is through set-pieces. Again, set-pieces are a great weapon and specially against teams that camp. Ask Arsenal, oh sorry I meant Stoke City, they know best. The concern comes when majority of your chances come only through set-pieces.
Against Chelsea, United played 35 minutes with an extra man. In that spell, they created five chances from set-pieces and only two from open play — that’s it. It fits the pattern we’ve seen across the first five matches: Give United the ball, and they pose little threat outside of corners.
United won. Let’s look at the positives.
As highlighted in the Burnley analysis, United’s chance creation this season has leaned heavily on Cunha and Mbeumo’s aggressiveness and direct play. One method involves luring the opposition press, then finding either forward between the lines to pull centre-backs higher, while the other makes penetrating off-ball runs. Another approach is overloading one flank before switching play with a long pass — often from Bayindir or a centre-back — aiming to win the second ball and release Mbeumo’s run in behind. This allows United to attack quickly, directly, and with purpose.
The introduction of Šeško adds another flavor to that trick which is the flick on. Šeško’s ability as an aerial outlet offers more reliability to that approach. United simply go long, and as Šeško contests the duel, Mbeumo is ready to attack the gap vacated by the centre-back. Mbeumo plays with real aggression and has a knack for timing his runs perfectly, often anticipating the pass early.
“We know Ben is really strong on the first touch and we see Bryan’s characteristics playing for the last team (Brentford), and you can feel every detail, every run, every touch, Bryan is really aggressive in this run so we want that. We want to use the good things that he had at his former club. Those characteristics are really important for us.” Amorim said after the match.
We saw this same flick-on against Arsenal, when Bayındır’s long ball found Cunha, who showed brilliant control to get a shot away. The same idea has popped up against Fulham, City, and most recently Chelsea — though with a successful attempt at long last.
You could chalk Robert Sánchez’s error up to luck, but it’s worth noting United have been trying this ploy repeatedly — and this time, it finally paid off. From an analyst’s perspective, my question to Amorim would be: how sustainable is this approach? Still, in this match, it handed United their biggest advantage, so there’s little to argue.
By the end of the first half and into the second, balance was restored at 10v10 after Casemiro’s dismissal. United surrendered both possession and territory, but crucially, they kept their composure. Dropping into a passive 5–3–1, they struggled to regain control of the ball.
United’s out-of-possession struggles have been discussed before, but to recap: their narrow 5–2–3 press relies heavily on the wide centre-backs stepping up to track runners into midfield. In this match, though, going a man down and holding a two-goal cushion forced them into a three-man midfield instead, subsequently, they weren’t forced to rely on those step ups.
After the Fulham match, Amorim pointed out that United’s lack of control, even while leading, leaves them increasingly exposed in defensive transitions.
“When we score the goal, we forget about maintaining the way we should play,” Amorim said after last month’s draw with Fulham. “We were just thinking about maintaining the result. We want to win so badly that we forget about maintaining the possession, trying to push the opponent (deeper). We just gave a little bit (of) the game to Fulham.”
United’s out-of-possession issues were less evident due to a 3-man midfield— but also taking into account that Chelsea had no attacking threat beyond the wing-back Reece James and João Pedro. Additionally, Amorim also opted for defense rather than control, shown by his substitution of Šeško for Ugarte. After all, a midfield trio of Ugarte, Fernandes, and Amad hardly suggests control.
One other positive was United’s ability to hold a compact defensive shape — first time — throughout the second half, and barely allowed Chelsea spaces between the lines. While Chelsea threatened to equalize late on, United were not leaking chances.
Ruben Amorim: “Our fans, our supporters are easy to please. If you give your all, they will be there for you. That’s something our players need to understand. To get the fans behind us, we just need to run, fight and tackle.”
That quote from Amorim summed up the performance vs Chelsea. United didn’t give up when they went a man down. Usually, United implodes whenever something goes against them (i.e. a red card or penalty). All United players had to do is run, fight and tackle. And that, they did.
Problems are still there but we can take solace from the effort displayed and the win. We can only hope this could be a springboard for the evolution Amorim talked about.
Thank you.
Abdel Rahman
